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Abstract
Around 1931 Zermelo had an extended correspondence with the young Reinhold Baer concerning the edition
of Cantor’s collected works. Some of the letters also deal with Skolem’s paradox and Gödel’s first incompleteness
theorem. Whereas Zermelo’s letters are lost, most of Baer’s letters are contained in the Zermelo Nachlass. Besides
giving insight into Zermelo’s reaction to Skolem’s and Gödel’s results, the letters also demonstrate Baer’s clear
understanding of the behavior of models of set theory and of the relevance of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Zusammenfassung
Um 1931 korrespondiert Zermelo intensiv mit dem jungen Reinhold Baer wegen der Herausgabe der
gesammelten Werke Cantors; doch auch das Skolemsche Paradoxon und Gödels erster Unvollständigkeitssatz
spielen eine Rolle. Während Zermelos Briefe verloren sind, befinden sich Baers Briefe großenteils in Zermelos
Nachlass. Sie erlauben Einblicke in Zermelos Reaktion auf die Ergebnisse von Gödel und Skolem. Zugleich
bezeugen sie, wie klar Baer in mengentheoretischen Modellen denken konnte und die Bedeutung des ersten
Gödelschen Unvollständigkeitssatzes erkannt hat.
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1. Introduction
Early in 1930, having been provided with the galley proofs of [Skolem, 1930],1 Zermelo learnt about
[Skolem, 1923]: If the notion of definiteness in the separation axiom is made precise by first-order
definability, then the axioms of set theory—if consistent at all—admit a countable model. The fact that
such a countable model satisfies the sentence claiming the existence of uncountably many sets became
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1 See Ebbinghaus [2001, 6 and 10] for details.0315-0860/$ – see front matter  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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universe of sets, had aimed at a finitary axiom system describing this universe as adequately as possible.
He therefore was worried when faced with Skolem’s results that pointed to unsurmountable difficulties in
this respect. A little bit later he also got acquainted with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem that points
to a likewise principal limitation of formalized mathematics. This result went against his conviction that
there are no undecidable statements in mathematics.
As extensively discussed,3 Zermelo located the reason for these insufficiencies in the limitation to
finitary systems and, henceforth, intensively worked on the conception of infinitary languages and an
infinitary logic as the only appropriate framework for doing mathematics. At the same time he fought
against the Skolem paradox with the ultimate goal of refuting the existence of countable models of set
theory.
The Zermelo Nachlass contains about two dozen letters that Reinhold Baer wrote to Zermelo between
1930 and 1932 and that are mainly concerned with the edition of Cantor’s collected works [Cantor,
1932].4 Some of the letters address the results of Gödel and Skolem. As the Baer Nachlass no longer
exists, the counterparts are lost.5 However, to some extent the Baer letters allow Zermelo’s thoughts to be
reconstructed, thus giving us further information about the important period around 1930 when Zermelo
shifted from finitary to infinitary conceptions.
Baer and Zermelo had gotten to know each other when Baer held a position in the mathematics
department of the University of Freiburg (Germany) from 1926 to 1928 as an assistant of the algebraist
Alfred Loewy. Besides aiming at his Habilitation in algebra, Baer was open to set theory and the
foundations of mathematics. Three set-theoretic publications, among them [Baer, 1929], give evidence
to these interests. After his Habilitation in 1928 he became a Privatdozent at the University of Halle,
the university of Georg Cantor. Because of the anti-Jewish decrees of the Nazis he left Germany in the
spring of 1933. A two-year stay at the University of Manchester was followed by stays at the Institute for
Advanced Study in Princeton and at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In 1938 he became
a professor of mathematics at the University of Illinois at Urbana. In 1956 he returned to Germany to
accept a professorship at the University of Frankfurt, where he founded a school in group theory whose
most influential work was concerned with soluble and nilpotent groups. Baer died in 1979 at the age
of 77. Further details may be found in the obituary [Gruenberg, 1981].
During his appointment in Halle Baer maintained contact with Zermelo. His letters show that he was
fully aware of the problems and perspectives coming with Gödel’s and Skolem’s work. He thus belongs
to the small group of people that instantly recognized what had happened here.
In the following we comment on Baer’s letters as far as they are concerned with Gödel and Skolem
[Baer, 1930/1931], treating Skolem first. In Appendix we provide the original texts. We refer to the letters
by their date.
2 Ideell gesetzt and “existing only in the sense of a Platonic idea” [Zermelo, 1932b, 1].
3 See, for example, van Dalen and Ebbinghaus [2000], Ebbinghaus [2001], Taylor [1993], Taylor [2002].
4 In the preface, Zermelo acknowledges Baer’s essential support.
5 [Zermelo, 1931] is an exception.
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In [1929] Zermelo had given a more elaborate version of his notion of definiteness, as the original
one from [1908], due to its vagueness, had been subject to intensive criticism. In an answer to this paper,
Skolem [1930] points out that—up to second-order quantification—he had given the same definition
already in [1923], thereby informing Zermelo also about the existence of countable models of first-order
set theory. As mentioned above, this information caused a shift in Zermelo’s thinking. Whereas his [1929]
still yields a finitary version of definiteness and, hence, a finitary axiom system of set theory, he now will
become convinced that only infinitary languages together with an infinitary logic are really able to capture
the richness of mathematics. Moreover, he will aim at a refutation of the Skolem paradox by searching
for a proof that no countable model of set theory could exist. As described by van Dalen and Ebbinghaus
[2000], in 1937 he wrote up a flawed proof of this kind; the reason for the mistake—thinking of the
powerset in a countable model of set theory as being closed under arbitrary unions of elements—may
be localized both in the difficulties he had with argumentations inside a model of set theory and in his
epistemological convictions. It seems that the impetus of these convictions was so strong that he never
checked the formal correctness of Skolem’s [1923],6 but instantly aimed at overcoming the deficiency
of finitary approaches to mathematics. The Baer correspondence, starting when Zermelo had just been
informed about [Skolem, 1930], will give valuable informations concerning Zermelo’s first reactions.
The earliest letter in the Nachlass (May 27, 1930) answers a letter of Zermelo that apparently had
contained the news about Skolem’s [1930] together with an engaged reaction. Having wished Zermelo
good luck in his war against Skolem, Baer pleads for a de-escalation:
Some objective remarks: Fraenkel, von Neumann, etc. have an axiom system that, because of what it says about “definite,” allows for
“absolutely” countable models. Actually, this is not a disaster; for the usual set theoretic inferences are not hurt by this fact; can it not
be seen as an advantage of these systems that they provide more possibilities as the system you treat in your new paper?7
Having put forward the question of how many “reasonable” versions of definiteness might exist for
Zermelo’s system and adopting the pragmatic point of view by which Skolem [1923] had justified his
first-order version of definiteness, he continues:
To be called reasonable, first of all a notion of definiteness should ensure the usual set theoretical conclusions. Only in the second
place would I request that cardinalities should be invariant under transitions to larger domains of sets.—Anyway, there is one fact that
should be observed: a subset of a set belonging to some domain of sets may exist even if there is no definite function according to the
axiom of separation which defines it; it only is not forced to exist in this case.
Anyhow, I am very interested in your answer to Skolem; did I understand you correctly: you want to prove that a domain of sets
which satisfies the axiom of choice cannot be countable in any domain of sets including it? For this purpose you really must have a
very sharp axiom of separation! I am very curious to what extent this holds.
The last paragraph shows that Zermelo really aimed at a quick answer to Skolem as he had indicated in
[1930, Footnote 1] and that already very early he tried to refute the existence of countable models. So
6 According to Kreisel [1980, 210] “he had a [. . .] staunch realist Weltanschauung: so much so that he simply refused to look
at the tainted subjects.”
7 [Zermelo, 1930a]; here Zermelo considers ZF set theory without restricting separation or replacement; he builds up the von
Neumann hierarchy, where the initial level may be some domain of urelements. The “possibilities,” i.e., the models of ZF set
theory Baer refers to, are just the levels of these hierarchies that belong to strongly inaccessible cardinals.
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proof of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem or the applicability of the theorem to set theory. Up to a
possible exception discussed in Footnote 10, there seems to be no passage in the Nachlass where Zermelo
clearly utters doubts of the first kind, whereas doubts of the latter kind are abundant and, therefore, might
have been the by far dominant ones. The middle part of the last quotation reveals their nature: Baer’s
remark exactly fits the criticism which Zermelo brings forward in [1931?, 2] to the effect that first-
order definiteness concerned only the definition of certain subsets, but not their objective existence in
the totality of all subsets; it thus “cannot be exploited for an arbitrary restriction of the domain of sets
and for a nonsensical relativization of the notions of subset and cardinality, in this way reinterpreting or
diluting the notion of the continuum.” Hence, we may assume, his refutation of the existence of countable
models of set theory was to exhibit the uncountability of the continuum or, equivalently, of the power
set of countably infinite sets. When trying to do so, the properties needed would have to go beyond
Skolem’s first-order axioms; in Baer’s words they would have to make use of “a very sharp axiom of
separation.” From Baer’s next letter, less than a week later, we can reconstruct certain features which
show that Zermelo planned to proceed in the way just described. The letter (June 2, 1930) consists of five
“remarks to the Löwenheim–Skolem paradox.” The essence is contained in the first two remarks.
Given a model M of set theory and a countable set S of M , Zermelo apparently, using a well-ordering
of the power set S ′ of S, had constructed a partial enumeration of S ′ of a length uncountable in M with
the intention of concluding from this that S ′ had to be uncountable. Baer has doubts, and he gives an
exact analysis of the reason:
1. There is a point in your proof of the “invariance of cardinalities” which still does not satisfy me. [. . .] Let β be an ordinal number
from M which in M belongs to a number class that is higher than the second number class.8 Then you still have to show that in any
model extending M the ordinal β belongs to a number class that is higher than the second one. This seems to be the real problem. For
the following reason I believe that a positive solution will be improbable:
The idea of a proof would be as follows: let β be the first ordinal in [a model] M ′ that belongs to the third number class and
let M ′′ be a model including M ′9 in which β belongs to the second number class. Then from the set B of all ordinal numbers < β
(B is a set in both M ′ and M ′′) one can pick a subsequence β1, β2, . . . , βn, . . . of type ω such that limn→ω βn = β, βn < β. This
subsequence {βn} is in M ′′ a subset of B; but I do not know whether {β1, β2, . . . , βn, . . .} must be a set in M ′, too, and in general,
this might not be true. (Footnote: The axiom of replacement also does not help, because the formation of the set {βn} in M ′′ and the
mapping of the βn to the integers need not be a function which is admissible in M ′ .)
Baer’s analysis hits just the point where Zermelo’s argument was doomed to fail. But cautiously he
remarks that this consideration only makes it plausible that there is a serious problem and that it does not
show the Skolem paradox to be justified. On the other hand, he emphasizes that Skolem’s deduction of
the paradox was correct; for with respect to a possible gap in Skolem’s argumentation Zermelo may have
addressed, he says:
2. Nor do I believe that your objection against Skolem’s proof can be elaborated in such a way that one might be successful in finding
a gap; for as far as I know, in the proofs for the existence of absolutely countable models of set theory difficulties always stem from
8 The first number class consists of the finite ordinals; the second number class consists of the countably infinite ordinals,
among them the first infinite ordinal ω; the third number class consists of the ordinals of the first uncountable cardinality ℵ1,
among them the smallest uncountable ordinal ω1; the next number class consists of the ordinals of power ℵ2 with the smallest
ordinal ω2; etc.
9 The modern reader should assume that M ′ is a transitive submodel of M ′′; then the ordinals in M ′ form an initial segment
of the ordinals in M ′′.
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claim the existence of a single set with a certain property; hence, in general they do not affect the cardinality of the model.
By the way, despite all my endeavor, I have not been able to find a sound objection against the applicability of the surely true
theorem of Löwenheim10 to the usual axioms of set theory.
But whatever I have said, it is my opinion, not my knowledge.
Once more less than a week later, Baer writes a new letter (June 7, 1930) “to torment you a little bit
with Skolemism in order to let all good things come to an end.”11 It also has two important parts. The
first one deals with the adequacy of Skolem’s procedure, thereby again expressing faith in the correctness
of his arguments:
One has to distinguish between two questions (I see from your card that you do the same):
(1) Are the assumptions of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem satisfied with the usual axiom systems of set theory?
(2) Can one exhibit a countable model of these axiom systems in case they are consistent?
A positive answer to (1) yields a positive answer to (2), and a negative answer to (2) yields a negative answer to (1), but a negative
answer to (1) does not yield much with respect to (2).
I had great reservations about whether (1) applies to Fraenkel’s axiomatization; however, it appears to me that Skolem’s
argumentations12 [. . .] are conclusive; however, one easiliy can slip with these delicate things.
The second part of the present letter is devoted to the absoluteness arguments discussed in the
preceding one. Apparently Zermelo had responded to Baer’s objections, neglecting Baer’s technical
analysis and varying his procedure. So—in contrast to Baer—he must still have been convinced that
usual set theory could not be performed in a first-order framework—his answer to both (1) and (2) was
a clear “no.” As we know from his flawed refutation of the existence of countable models of set theory
from 1937, also in the future he would not change his mind. Baer’s counterarguments—those against the
original procedure by which he starts and those against the new variant—are a further fine example of an
early discussion of absoluteness:
Concerning (2), I have not really understood your argumentation (I mean your last card). Let M1 and M2 be two models, M1 con-
tained13 in M2, M1 allowing well-orderings and diagonalization,14 M1 countable in M2; then the initial number ω11 of the third
number class in M1 belongs to the second number class in M2 as does any initial number ω1ν from M1; on the other hand, the initial
number ω21 of the 3rd number class in M2 does not exist in M1.
10 The text does not make it possible to decide whether Zermelo doubts the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem or its application.
As argued above, doubts of the first kind are rare. In fact, Baer’s emphasis of the “sure truth” of the theorem seems to be the only
passage in the Nachlass that might point to such doubts. The next letter will give evidence that Zermelo might have accepted
the theorem.
11 Literally translated: “in order to let your trees not grow into heaven.”
12 In Skolem [1929], where it is proved that Fraenkel’s axiomatization [1922] can be given in the first-order language of set
theory.
13 Again as a transitive submodel. As M1 is countable in M2 and the ordinals of M1 form an initial segment of the ordinals
in M2, the ordinals of M1 are less than the first ordinal in M2 which is uncountable in M2, i.e., in Baer’s notation, less than ω21.
14 Probably Zermelo made use of diagonalizations in order to define the partial enumeration of the power set S′ of the
countable set S from M1 at successors of limit ordinals. The procedure might have been similar to that lying at the heart of
Cantor’s proof of the uncountability of the continuum: Given S = {s0, s1, . . .} and a countable subset {s′0, s′1, . . .} of S′ in M1
which consists of the elements of S′ enumerated so far, one can get a new subset s′ of S in M1 by letting si ∈ s′ iff si /∈ s′i for
i ∈ ω.
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only applies to sets which are countable in M1 and ω11 is uncountable in M1—a fact that “you put into
my mouth.” Therefore, he continues, Zermelo is right in shifting the problem to that of the relativity of
ordinal number classes. However, his criticism reveals that also with this variant Zermelo fails in arguing
strictly in the model concerned:
You want to deduce a contradiction from the fact that all ω1ν , the initial numbers of M1, in M2 belong to the second number class,
i.e., from
ω0  ω1ν < ω21 = initial number of the 3rd number class in M2.




does not seem to lead to a contradiction. You cannot even claim the existence of ω1
ω21
which, by the way, would yield the contradiction,
too. Rather, there will exist only ω1ν satisfying 0 ν < ω21 if you cannot ensure the existence of larger ω
1
ν by other means.
In the last letter concerned with Skolem (July 12, 1930), Baer refers to Zermelo’s “new reason” to
fight against Skolemism—as it seems, a fight for a designated set-theoretic universe.15 Whereas hitherto
he has shown understanding for Zermelo’s convictions and a pragmatism in the sense of Skolem, he now
distances himself further from Zermelo:16
But Cantorian set theory per se does not exist, whereas there might exist various models of set theory; as Zermelo has shown in a
not yet published paper,17 in such models the series of ordinal numbers may have different “length.” Actually, what S[kolem] claims
is only this: If there is a model at all, then there also is a countable one; up to now the existence of effectively uncountable models
has not been shown, in any form, however hypothetical it might be, maybe apart from Mr. Becker18 or Brouwer who can see this by
urintuition or something of that kind.—I would appreciate if somewhere in the near future we would have the occasion to “settle” all
these things orally.
Such a conversation did not take place. As we know, less than two years later Baer left Germany and only
returned after Zermelo’s death.
3. Gödel: The first incompleteness theorem
In September 1931, at the annual meeting of the German mathematical association, both Gödel and
Zermelo delivered talks. Gödel represented his incompleteness results, while Zermelo described a system
of infinitary languages that he had developed along the lines of his program to overcome the deficiences
15 As described in Ebbinghaus [2001], between 1930 and 1931 Zermelo worked out an earlier idea that aimed at a designated
universe of set theory, the universe of sets that are definable up to isomorphisms. He will claim that this model exactly coincides
with what Cantor had in mind. As Baer explicitly comments on it only in a letter from January 1931, it is not clear whether
“Cantorian set theory per se” in the following passage already refers to it.
16 In the following letters concerning Gödel, the equilibrium will come back.
17 In Zermelo [1930b].
18 Oskar Becker (1889–1964) was a philosopher who obtained his Habiliation with Husserl in 1922 at the University of
Freiburg and became a professor at the University of Bonn in 1931. He was sympathetic toward Brouwer’s intuitionism
as opposed to Hilbertian formalism; cf. [Becker, 1927]. During his time in Freiburg Becker showed interest in Zermelo’s
foundational work. He supported Zermelo in preparing the edition of Cantor’s philosophical papers (Part IV of [Cantor, 1932]).
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against Gödel. A picture of the resulting debate is given in Dawson [1997, 76].19 There is the question
how early and to what extent Zermelo was informed about Gödel’s results and their scope. The published
extended abstract [Zermelo, 1932a] contains a programmatic introduction arguing against both Gödel and
Skolem because of their finitary approaches; however, it was written only after the meeting (cf. [Zermelo,
1931]).
Apparently, Gödel’s [1931] was brought to Zermelo’s attention by Baer. On May 13, 1931 Baer writes:
The main result of Gödel’s paper, about which I informed you in my last letter,20 can pointedly and, hence, not fully correctly, be
formulated as follows: If A is a countable, consistent logical system, for example arithmetic, then there is a sentence in A which is
not decidable in A (but may be decidable in extended systems). Hurrah, also logicians have discovered diagonalization!—By the way,
you can really profit greatly from this “new gentleman”; he is strongly interested in philosophy and the foundations of mathematics,
moreover in functional analysis (let him give a talk about this, it is very amusing), summation procedures, etc.
Zermelo’s answer may have been sceptical with respect to the relevance of Gödel’s result. Baer seems
to share the scepticism, but immediately cuts back by emphasizing the importance of incompleteness
(May 24, 1931):
Many thanks for your cards. I believe that we share our opinion about Goedel. But actually I think that his work is rather rewarding;
for after all it proves that a logic of the strength of, say, Principia mathematica is insufficient as a base for mathematics to the extent
we would like to have. There are two possible consequences:
(1) one surrenders to “classical” logic (as Skolem does) and amputates mathematics;
(2) one declares, as you do, that “classical” logic is insufficient.
Standpoint (1) is more comfortable; for it gets by on “God’s present” of the natural numbers, whereas standpoint (2) has to
swallow the total series of transfinite ordinal numbers, as they are necessary to build up set theory to the extent you have performed
and as without this greater “present of God” one cannot get beyond what Skolem etc. reach—but it is strange that up to now, apart
from the continuum problem, the “poorhouse mathematics” of Skolem etc. suffices to represent all what happens in the “mathematics
of the rich.”—In any case, Gödel can be credited for having made clear how far one can get with standpoint (1); it is a matter of faith,
whether one now decides in favor of (1) or (2). I suspect that logicians will decide in favor of (1), while mathematicians rather will
decide in favor of (2).
Baer’s remark that Zermelo would have declared classical logic to be insufficient, together with the
context in which it is given, may be considered evidence that Zermelo’s conviction about the necessity
of an alternative logic (that was to be an infinitary one) arose from his resistance against Skolem and was
strengthened by his resistance against Gödel.21
The following letters do not continue this discussion. On September 9, 1931 Baer informs Zermelo
that he will not come to the meeting of the German mathematical association. After the meeting, on
October 26, 1931, having been informed by Zermelo “concerning Gödel,” he expresses interest in Gödel’s
first letter [Grattan-Guinness, 1979] to Zermelo. In (November 3, 1931) he comments on Zermelo’s
answer to Gödel [Dawson, 1985], tending toward Zermelo’s point of view:
19 The discussion was continued in a series of letters; see Grattan-Guinness [1979] and Dawson [1985].
20 The letter is not contained in the Nachlass.
21 There is just one earlier witness, aiming only at Skolem: In the second appendix to [1930b], Zermelo lists five projects for
further research; in an explanation of the last project on the relationship between mathematics and Anschauung he states that
mathematical science only starts by treating intuitively (anschaulich) given material in an “infinitistic-logical” (infinitistisch-
logisch) manner. Concerning the question whether there might be earlier witnesses independent of Skolem and Gödel and going
back as early as 1921, see Ebbinghaus [2001].
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that formally Gödel’s proof will be correct; as regards content it shows that he and the people whose point of view he follows,
are wrong.—In his new History of Logic22 H. Scholz very nicely writes that the logicians in Vienna23 would be very pleasant and
competent, but that we would like to obey their dictatorship just as little as any other one.
The exchange of letters ends in February 1932, when Cantor’s collected works had been edited.
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Appendix
May 27, 1930
[. . .] Zu Ihrem Krieg gegen Skolem etc. Heil und Sieg und fette Beute. Der “Aufsatz” von Skolem ist ja inzwischen erschienen, na,
einen übermässig intelligenten Eindruck macht er ja nicht.
Ein paar sachliche Bemerkungen dazu: Fraenkel, v. Neumann etc. haben ein Axiomensystem, das auf Grund der Aussagen
über “definit” auch Erfüllungen zulässt, die “absolut” abzählbar sind. Das ist doch an sich kein Unglück; denn die üblichen
mengentheoretischen Schlussweisen werden dadurch nicht betroffen; ist es nicht fast ein Vorzug dieser Systeme, dass sie noch mehr
Möglichkeiten Spielraum geben als das von Ihnen in Ihrer neuen Arbeit behandelte? Gerade im Sinne der Tendenzen, die Sie in
dieser neuen Arbeit propagieren. All Ihre Mengenbereiche genügen auch den Fraenkelschen etc. Axiomen, nicht aber umgekehrt.
Es ist doch vielleicht noch eine interessante Frage, wieviele “vernünftige” Möglichkeiten es gibt, die Definitheit zu erklären—bei
fester Ordnungszahl und Charakteristik (ich hoffe, Ihre Bezeichnungen richtig wiedergegeben zu haben). Dabei ist ein Begriff der
Definitheit in erster Linie dann als vernünftig zu bezeichnen, wenn er die üblichen mengentheoretischen Schlüsse sichert; in zweiter
Linie erst würde ich die Forderung stellen, dass die Mächtigkeiten invariant gegenüber Übergängen zu grösseren Mengenbereichen
sein sollen.—Eines muss man doch bei allem beachten: eine Teilmenge einer Menge eines Mengenbereichs kann auch existieren,
wenn es keine gemäss Aussonderungsaxiom definite Funktion gibt, die sie definiert; sie muss es dann nur nicht.—
Jedenfalls interessiert mich Ihre Erwiderung gegen Skolem sehr; habe ich Sie richtig verstanden: Sie wollen beweisen, dass ein
Mengenbereich, in dem das Auswahlaxiom erfüllt ist, sich in keinem umfassenden Mengenbereich als abzählbar erweisen kann?
Dazu müssen Sie doch wohl ein sehr scharfes Aussonderungsaxiom haben! Ich bin sehr gespannt, wie allgemein das gilt! [. . .]
June 2, 1930
[. . .] Zum Löwenheim–Skolemschen Paradoxon folgende Bemerkungen:
1. Ihr Beweis von der “Invarianz der Mächtigkeiten” hat mich an einer Stelle noch nicht befriedigt. Sie gehen so vor: Sei M ein
Modell einer Mengenlehre, m eine in M abzählbare Menge, m′ die Potenzmenge von m in M . Dann lässt sich m′ wohlordnen und,
wenn v irgendeine Teilmenge von m′ ist, die in M enthalten und in M abzählbar ist, so gibt es ein in der Wohlordnung von m′ erstes
Element von m′, das nicht in v vorkommt [say, mv ]. Dann bilden Sie die Mengenfolge vα durch
v0 = {m}, vα+1 = vα + {mvα }, lim
β<α
vβ = vα,
22 It is [Scholz, 1931]; cf. pages 64sq.
23 The members of the Vienna circle.
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in M zu einer höheren als der zweiten Zahlklasse gehört, so haben Sie also noch zu zeigen, dass β auch in jedem M umfassenden
Modell zu einer höheren als der zweiten Zahlklasse gehört. Das scheint mir das eigentliche Problem zu sein, dessen positive Lösung
ich aus folgendem Grunde für unwahrscheinlich halte:
Der Beweisansatz dürfte etwa so sein: sei β in M ′ die erste Ordinalzahl, die zur dritten Zahlklasse gehört und sei M ′′ ein M ′
umfassendes Modell, in dem β zur zweiten Zahlklasse gehört; dann lässt sich aus der Menge B aller Ordinalzahlen < β (B ist in
M ′ und in M ′′ Menge) eine Teilfolge β1, β2, . . . , βn, . . . vom Typus ω herausgreifen, so dass limn→ω βn = β, βn < β ist. Diese
Teilfolge {βn} ist in M ′′ Teilmenge von B; ob aber {β1, β2, . . . , βn, . . .} auch in M ′ Menge ist, weiss ich nicht, und das dürfte wohl
im allgemeinen auch nicht zu bejahen sein. Footnote: Hier hilft auch das Ersetzbarkeitsaxiom nicht, da die Bildung der Menge {βn}
in M ′′ und die Zuordnung der βn zu den ganzen Zahlen noch keine in M ′ zulässige Funktion zu sein braucht.
Damit ist aber nur plausibel gemacht, dass die “Invarianz der Mächtigkeiten” sich auf diesem Weg kaum wird zeigen lassen;
daraus soll natürlich nicht folgen, dass das Löwenheim–Skolemsche Paradoxon zu Recht besteht, bzw. Ihre Vermutung falsch ist.
2. Ich glaube auch nicht, dass Ihr Einwand gegen Skolems Beweis sich so wird ausbauen lassen, dass es gelingt, eine Lücke
aufzuweisen; denn soweit ich die Beweise für die Existenz absolut abzählbarer Modelle der Mengenlehre kenne, macht bei ihnen
immer nur das Aussonderungsaxiom Schwierigkeiten, während das Auswahlaxiom und das Ersetzbarkeitsaxiom deshalb harmlos
sind, weil sie zu einer beliebigen Menge immer nur die Existenz einer einzigen Menge gewisser Eigenschaft fordern, also die
Mächtigkeit des Modells i.A. nicht treffen.
Mir ist es übrigens nicht gelungen, trotzdem ich mir grosse Mühe gegeben habe, einen stichhaltigen Einwand gegen die
Anwendbarkeit des wohl sicher richtigen Löwenheimschen Satzes auf die üblichen Axiomensysteme der Mengenlehre zu finden.
Aber das sind natürlich nur Meinungen, kein Wissen. [. . .]
June 7, 1930
[. . .] Sozusagen, damit Ihre Bäume nicht in den Himmel wachsen, möchte ich Sie noch ein wenig mit der Skolemitis “ärgern”. Man
muss da zwei Fragen unterscheiden (aus Ihrer Karte entnehme ich, dass Sie es auch tun):
1. sind die Voraussetzungen des Löwenheim–Skolemschen Satzes bei den üblichen Axiomensystemen der Mengenlehre erfüllt?
2. lässt sich, falls diese Ax.-syst. der Mengenlehre widerspruchsfrei sind, ein abzählbares Modell angeben?
Aus einer positiven Antwort auf 1. folgt auch die positive Antwort auf 2., aus einer negativen Antwort auf 2. auch die negative
Antwort auf 1.; aus einer negativen Antwort auf 1. folgt aber nicht viel bzgl. 2.
ad 1. habe ich sehr starke Bedenken gehabt, ob es bei der Fraenkelschen Axiomatik geht; jedoch schien es mir, als ob die
Skolemschen Argumentationen (vgl. Th. Skolem: Über einige Grundlagenfragen der Mathematik; Skrifter utgift af det Norske
Videnskaps Akademi i Oslo I. Mat.-Naturv. Klasse 1929 No. 4 §2 S. 9ff.) zwingend wären; aber bei diesen heiklen Dingen ist
ein Versehen leicht möglich.
ad 2. Ihre Argumentation habe ich noch nicht recht verstanden (ich meine Ihre letzte Karte). Seien M1 und M2 zwei Modelle,
M1 in M2 enthalten, in M1 Wohlordnung und Diagonalverfahren ausführbar, M1 in M2 abzählbar; dann gehört die Anfangszahl ω11
der dritten Zahlklasse in M1 in M2 zur zweiten Zahlklasse, überhaupt jede Anfangszahl ω1ν aus M1; dagegen ist die Anfangszahl ω21
der 3. Zahlklasse in M2 in M1 gar nicht vorhanden.
Die Construktion Ihrer Mengen vα aus M1 vermittels Diagonalverfahren und Wohlordnung lässt sich dann für alle α  ω11
ausführen; dagegen können Sie auf v
ω11
das Diagonalverfahren nicht mehr anwenden, da, wie Sie mir ganz richtig in den Mund
legten, ja v
ω11
in M1 nicht mehr abzählbar ist, das Diagonalverfahren aber nur auf in M1 abzählbare Teilmengen der fraglichen
Potenzmenge anwendbar ist. v
ω11+1
lässt sich also mit Ihrer Methode nicht mehr bilden.
Nun verschieben Sie ganz richtig, wie ich es ja auch in meinem vorigen Brief angedeutet habe, das Problem auf das der Relativität
der Ordinalzahlklassen und wollen aus der Tatsache, dass alle ω1ν , die Anfangszahlen aus M1, in M2 zur zweiten Zahlklasse gehören,
d.h. aus
ω0  ω1ν < ω21 =Anfangszahl der 3. Zahlklasse in M2
einen Widerspruch herleiten. Hierzu bilden Sie ω1ω1; das geht aber nicht; denn das “absolute” ω1 steht Ihnen ja nicht zur Verfügung;
sie können nur ω1
ω11
bilden, was zu keinem Widerspruch Anlass zu geben scheint. Nicht einmal die Existenz von ω1
ω21
können Sie
behaupten, die übrigens auch schon den gesuchten Widerspruch lieferte; vielmehr werden nur solche ω1ν existieren, die 0  ν < ω21
erfüllen, es sei denn, dass Sie die Existenz grösserer ω1ν auf andere Weise sichern könnten, was den Widerspruch lieferte; hierzu
können Sie aber das Diagonalverfahren nicht heranziehen; denn das liefert nur die Existenz von Ordinalzahlen α, die α  ω1ν für





, . . .; aber die
ω1
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deren Existenz bereits anderweitig bewiesen ist, weiterbauen; das ganze Verfahren kann man weiter iterieren; da man aber keinen
limes über alle möglichen Verfahren bilden kann, wird man über abzählbares kaum hinaus kommen. [. . .]
July 12, 1930
Ihren neuen wahren Grund zur Bekämpfung der Skolemitis werden Sie wohl inzwischen selbst widerlegt haben. Cantorsche
Mengenlehre schlechthin gibt es doch nicht; dagegen gibt es vielleicht allerlei Modelle der Mengenlehre; und in denen können,
wie Zermelo in einer noch nicht veröffentlichten Arbeit gezeigt hat, die Reihen der Ordinalzahlen verschieden “lang” sein. Was
S[kolem] behauptet, ist doch nur dies: Gibt es überhaupt ein Modell, so auch ein abzählbares; die Existenz effektiv überabzählbarer
Modelle ist noch in keiner noch so hypothetischen Form bewiesen worden, abgesehen vielleicht von Herrn Becker oder Brouwer,
die das [mit] Urintuition oder dergl. einsehen können.—Ich würde mich freuen, wenn wir bald einmal Gelegenheit hätten, dies alles
mündlich zu “bereinigen”. [. . .]
May 13, 1931
[. . .] Das Hauptergebnis der Goedelschen Arbeit, auf die ich Sie in meinem letzten Brief hinwies, kann man pointiert und also
nicht ganz korrekt so formulieren: ist A ein abzählbares, widerspruchsloses logisches System, z.B. die Arithmetik, so gibt es in
A einen Satz, der in A nicht entscheidbar ist (wohl aber in umfassenderen Systemen). Hurra, die Logiker haben auch schon das
Diagonalverfahren entdeckt!—Von dem “neuen Herrn” können Sie übrigens wirklich viel haben; er ist sehr stark philosophisch und
an Grundlagen interessiert, weiter Funktionalanalysis (lassen Sie ihn darüber vortragen, das ist sehr amüsant), Summationsverfahren
u.s.w.
May 24, 1931
[. . .] vielen Dank für Ihre interessanten Karten. Ich glaube, dass wir betr. Goedel ziemlich einer Meinung sind. Nur finde ich die
Arbeit eigentlich doch recht lohnend; denn sie beweist schliesslich, dass sich auf einer Logik im Umfang der principia mathematica
oder dergl. keine Mathematik in dem von uns gewünschten Umfang aufbauen lässt. Daraus kann man zwei Consequenzen ziehen:
1. man capituliert vor der “klassischen” Logik (wie Skolem) und amputiert die Mathematik; 2. man erklärt dann, wie Sie es tun, die
“klassische” Logik für unzulänglich.—Der Standpunkt 1. ist bequemer; denn er kommt mit dem “Gottesgeschenk” der natürlichen
Zahlen aus, während 2. die ganze Reihe der transfiniten Ordinalzahlen schlucken muss, da diese dann unumgängliche Voraussetzung
beim Aufbau der Mengenlehre in dem von Ihnen durchgeführten Umfange sind und man ohne dieses grössere “Gottesgeschenk”
eben nicht über das hinauskommt, was Skolem etc. erreichen.—Merkwürdig ist nur, dass bisher, abgesehen vom Continuumproblem,
die “Armenhausmathematik” der Skolem etc. völlig ausreichte, um alles wiederzugeben, was in der “Mathematik der Reichen”
geschieht.—Goedel hat jedenfalls das Verdienst, genau klargestellt zu haben, wieweit man mit dem Standpunkt 1. kommt; ob man
sich nun für 1. oder 2. entscheidet, ist Glaubenssache. Ich vermute, dass sich die Logistiker für 1., die Mathematiker mehr für 2.
entscheiden werden. [. . .]
November 3, 1931
[. . .] Ihre Antwort an Goedel finde ich ganz treffend; mir scheint es so (doch habe ich die Dinge zu wenig genau geprüft, um ein
bindendes Urteil auszusprechen): formal wird G’s Beweis richtig sein; inhaltlich zeigt er, dass er und die Leute, auf deren Standpunkt
er sich gestellt hat, Unrecht haben.—Sehr hübsch schreibt H. Scholz in einer kürzlich erschienenen Geschichte der Logik, dass die
Wiener Logistiker sehr nett und tüchtig seien, dass wir uns aber ihrer Diktatur ebensowenig wie einer anderen fügen wollten. [. . .]
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